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abstract 
Teleological reasoning was common among authors of the XIII century. Certainly, 
the existence of a finalist order among things allowed them to explain both the 
movement of natural bodies and the movement of the celestial bodies: for these 
authors all things would move because of final causality. Aquinas’ Summa contra 
gentiles, which we analyze in the following, reproduces this same reasoning model. 
Taking as reference the movement of natural bodies, he tries to explain the meaning 
of a special category of movement, namely: human knowledge. Thus, he states that 
human knowledge is an expression of a natural appetite of our intelligence, the 
natural desire to know, which rests only in the knowledge of God, the first cause of 
the world. 
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The question about the natural desire to know God had occupied a prominent 
place in the discussions of medieval thinkers even prior to Saint Thomas.1 Albert 
the Great, for example, taught that wherever a natural desire exists there is also a 
tendency ordered to its end: natural inclinations are not vain, and the natural desire 
to know God is even less so, because natural desires have their own intelligibility 
and intrinsic meaning.2 Saint Thomas, relying on the words of his teacher Albert, 
held that there are no inclinations that act in vain,3 and that, to a certain degree, all 
the natural inclinations of all beings have God as their end.4 
After Aquinas, authors like Scotus taught that the natural desire was equivalent 
to an innate appetite inscribed in the nature of intellectual creatures (the Franciscan 
held that this desire should be understood as a necessary appetite, as a tendency 
that does not depend on freedom, as an inclination as deep as nature itself).5 And 
Cajetan, for his part, suggested that this natural desire is so radical that it was even 
prior to any other inclination or movement of the rational potencies.6
What we have discussed in the preceding paragraphs is a sample that demonstrates 
the importance that the problem of the natural desire to see God had in medieval 
thought. In this article we seek to develop Saint Thomas’s proposal and in particular 
his arguments in the Summa contra gentiles. Our intention is to present the meaning 
that this natural desire has in Thomist anthropology, highlighting the fact that this 
desire is a natural appetite of the mind, indeed the most radical and primary of the 
various natural appetites of human reason.
1. Use of an argument taken from physics
As its name indicates, in the Summa contra gentiles Saint Thomas is addressing 
persons who are not Christians, but who admit some of the truths that Christianity 
proclaims, or, at least, participate in the cultural background provided by the 
philosophy of Aristotle. In this context, Aquinas seeks to show that the ultimate end 
of every intellectual creature is understanding God. He does so while relying on the 
thesis that no desire is as sublime as that of understanding the truth.7 This desire is 
1. This paper forms part of a broader project, sponsored by the “Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Científico 
y Tecnológico” of the Government of Chile (1110452). An initial version of this article, shorter and 
in Spanish, was presented at the 9th International Conference De iustitia et iure, held in Buenos Aires, 
Argentina, in August of 2014, and will be published in the conference’s proceedings.
2. Albert the Great. In Metaphysicorum, I, 1, 4. In the same passage Albert explains that the natural 
desire to know is a kind of principle of knowledge.
3. Thomas Aquinas. Compendium theologiae, I, 104, 208.
4. Aquinas’s thesis is that all things have an appetite for God, at least implicitly (Thomas Aquinas. De 
veritate, XXII, 2).
5. John Duns Scotus. Quaestiones quodlibetales, XVII, 2. 
6. Thomas of Vio (Cajetan). In Summa theologiae, I-II, 113, 10, 1.
7. Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra gentiles, III, 50. It is important to note that, while it is true that the 
problem of the natural desire to see God occupies a preeminent place in the overall organization of the 
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only satisfied when the creature attains God (intellectually), He who is the “highest 
summit” and maker of all things.8 Therefore, if the creature does not achieve this 
end, neither will it attain the greater perfection to which it is inclined.
These affirmations are the subject of an interesting discussion in the context of 
Summa contra gentiles Book III, above all because, in referring to the problem of the 
end of man, many authors have argued that our télos télion is the will of God (qua 
supreme good). This is a statement that appears to adhere both to common sense 
and biblical teachings, which place the love of God and not knowledge of Him as the 
first of the commandments of both the Mosaic and New Testament laws.9
Despite this, however, Saint Thomas insists that ultimate happiness must not be 
sought in anything else than the operation of the intellect.10 The reason is simple: it is 
impossible that an act which arises from the will could be the ultimate end.11 Indeed, 
the good of man qua man consists in his reason being perfect in the knowledge of 
the truth, and that the inferior appetites obey reason and take their measure from it 
(given that what is specific to the human being is precisely his rationality).12 
As a result, Aquinas insists, what human reason wants, as being determined to it 
by natural inclination, is the ultimate end et ea quae in ipso includuntur, ut esse, cognitio 
veritatis, et aliqua huiusmodi13 Nonetheless, this affirmation alone is insufficient for 
understanding the nature of the so-called “natural desire to see-understand God.” 
Indeed, this desire is grafted into a complex interweaving of appetites that have 
their root in intellectual nature, those which, in turn, root themselves in the fertile 
earth of those most universal desires that are found in every being qua being.14 
With this in mind, in the current work we have preferred to deepen our inquiry 
into the nature of this natural desire, as well as its relation to the final end of man. 
We do not seek to start a debate about all of the arguments presented by Saint 
Thomas in Summa contra gentiles. There are already works dedicated to that purpose.15 
Our effort will focus solely on explaining the link this desire has with the problem 
Summa contra gentiles, Saint Thomas never investigates this issue directly, but instead discusses it in the 
context of his explanation of the state that people find themselves in after their death, see: Contra gentiles, 
III, 7.
8. Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra gentiles, III, 50.
9. For example: Saint Augustine. De civitate Dei, XIX, and De Trinitate XIII. Similarly: Saint Paul. First Letter 
to the Corinthians, XIII.
10. Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra gentiles, III, 50.
11. Thomas Aquinas. Summa theologiae, q. 1, a. 1.
12. González-Ayesta, Cruz. La verdad como bien según Tomás de Aquino. Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad 
de Navarra, 2006: 340.
13. Thomas Aquinas. De veritate, XXII, 5: “whatever is included in it: to be, knowledge of truth, and the 
like”. Translated by Robert W. Schmidt: Aquinas, Thomas, Truth Questiones 21-29, Chicago: Henry Regnery 
Company, 1954 <http://dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdeVer22.htm#5>.
14. Cambiasso, Jorge Guillermo. El deseo de entender la verdad en la “Summa contra gentiles” de santo Tomás de 
Aquino. Buenos Aires: Educa, 1999: 148.
15. For example: Pacheco, Cipriano Franco. O desejo natural da visão de Deus expressao de abertura humana ao 
trascendente, Dissertação Ad Lauream in Facultate Philosophiae apud Pontificiam Universitatem S. Thomae in Urbe, 
Rome: Pontificia Universitá San Tommaso d’Aquino, 2001.
Imago TemporIs. medIum aevum, ix (2015): 265-286 / issn 1888-3931 / doi 10.21001/itma.2015.9.12
268 SebaStián ContreraS and Joaquín GarCía-Huidobro
of movement and the telos [end] of the physical world, as well as on the study of 
the implications for human knowledge of this natural desire to see God. Let’s begin 
with what Aquinas tells us:
[c]orpus, quod naturali appetitu tendit in suum ubi, tanto vehementius et velocius movetur, 
quanto magis appropinquat fini: unde probat Aristoteles in I de caelo, quod motus naturalis 
rectus non potest esse ad infinitum, quia non magis moveretur postea quam prius. Quod 
igitur vehementius in aliquid tendit post quam prius, non movetur ad infinitum, sed ad 
aliquid determinatum tendit. Hoc autem invenimus in desiderio sciendi: quanto enim 
aliquis plura scit, tanto maiori desiderio affectat scire. Tendit igitur desiderium naturale 
hominis in sciendo ad aliquem determinatum finem. Hoc autem non potest esse aliud quam 
nobilissimum scibile, quod Deus est. Est igitur cognitio divina finis ultimus hominis. 16
The first thing that draws the reader’s attention about this text, which has a parallel 
in the Super Epistolam ad Hebraeos,17 is that all of Saint Thomas’s argumentation 
about God as ultimate end appears to be based on a physical principle that, strictly 
speaking, refers to the movement of bodies, which accelerate more the closer they 
come to their natural place. Indeed, Saint Thomas thinks that among bodies there 
are some that don’t have a natural place, as is the case with the celestial bodies, 
while others do have one. This is how he explains the fact that bodies fall. Recall 
that we are still many centuries distant from Newton: for the ancients and the 
medievals, a body falls or rises (as fire does) because it is seeking its natural place.18 
In the case of physical bodies, they fall more rapidly as they draw closer to their 
natural place. That is, the presence of a uniformly accelerated movement tells us 
that the body is not moving to infinity, but towards a determined end. When it 
reaches this goal, it will rest.
Furthermore, Saint Thomas seems to hold that whenever we encounter a 
movement of this type we can affirm that it is a movement directed to a goal. 
He then applies this reasoning to the desire to know: since that desire is a type of 
movement, and since it naturally increases, it will be oriented towards a determined 
16. Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra gentiles, III, 25: “a body tending toward its proper place (ubi) by 
natural appetite, is moved more forcibly and swiftly as it approaches its end. Thus, Aristotle proves, in On 
the Heavens I [8: 27a 18], (De Caelo) that natural motion in a straight line cannot go on to infinity, for 
then it would be no more moved later than earlier. So, a thing that tends more forcibly later than earlier, 
toward an objective, is not moved toward an indefinite objective, but tends toward some determinate 
thing. Now, we find this situation in the desire to know. The more a person knows, the more is he 
moved by the desire to know. Hence, man’s natural desire tends, in the process of knowing, toward 
some definite end. Now, this can be none other than the most noble object of knowledge, which is God. 
Therefore, divine knowledge is the ultimate end of man”.
17. The text is as follows: “a natural movement, the closer it gets to its goal, the more intense it becomes.” 
Thomas Aquinas. Super Epistolam ad Hebraeos, X, 2, 513 (“[q]uia motus naturalis quanto plus accedit ad 
terminum, magis intenditur.”) Translated by Larcher, Fabian R. Lander. Commentary on the letter of Saint 
Paul to the Hebrews. Wyoming: Aquinas Institute for the Study of Sacred Doctrine, 2012.
18. Aristotle. De caelo, 276a.
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end or goal. And to surprise our contemporaries even more, he indicates that this 
end can only be God.
Just reading the argument we are commenting on makes the reader’s mind want 
to raise at least the following objections: is it true that bodies move towards a natural 
place? And even if they do, can one imagine that the greater velocity and strength 
of a movement says to us that it is closer to that place?
In addition, these objections refer to the realm where the physical principle we 
indicated above applies. Let’s suppose for a moment that the principle is valid, and 
that in nature there are bodies that move ever faster, according to their increasing 
closeness to the place that corresponds to them, their natural place. Can we say 
with such simplicity that the same thing happens in the spiritual plane? It looks like 
Thomas is taking an invalid step from the world of facts to the field of the human 
spirit.
2. Things tend toward an end
The idea of natural places has been abandoned by physics for centuries now. 
A stone does not fall because it seeks its natural place or point of rest, but rather 
because of the gravitational force that the Earth exercises over it, or because of the 
deformation of space that the Earth produces. In the case of fire, it tends to rise 
for reasons that are very different from seeking a place that is above it. Even the 
manner of speaking has changed: if one examines the language used in the Summa 
contra gentiles, one will discover with surprise that Aquinas is continually saying that 
material things pursue determined ends, as though, just as with human beings, they 
were able to propose goals to themselves and pursue them. Today, however, stones 
and other material objects are receptors, not actors. They don’t seek anything: they 
are mere recipients of a series of forces that act on them. Later, in the face of the 
modern way of explaining the physical world, the language of earlier philosophers 
seems excessively anthropomorphic.19
Does that mean that Aquinas’s statements have lost all rational support? We think 
not. First of all, in ordinary language we still use anthropomorphic forms of speech, 
which make the world we live in more intelligible. We all still speak of the “rising of 
the sun,” of the “growth of the river” or of the “songs of the birds,” all of which only 
make sense by referring to the human world. But even within Newtonian physics 
there are expressions which are closer to the ancient and medieval ways of speaking 
of the physical world than one might think at first glance. The case of falling bodies 
is especially eloquent. In any school physics textbook one finds the doctrine that 
19. It bears noting that, as Spaemann says, even though teleological explanation of the natural world 
can be excessively anthropomorphic, what cannot be denied is that the finalistic explanation of nature 
is the only one that permits us to —more or less rigorously— understand the functioning of the natural 
order: Spaemann, Robert. Persons. The Difference Between “Someone” and “Something”. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006: 156 and following.
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bodies fall because they seek to reduce their potential energy to a minimum. It also 
teaches that kinetic energy increases to the degree that potential energy lessens. 
Therefore, the movement of falling bodies is uniformly accelerated. An explanation 
of this type is naturally more formalized than medieval teachings, but it doesn’t 
seem to differ greatly from the idea that falling bodies fall more rapidly to the degree 
that they approach a kind of natural place.
In any case, the difference between the ancient-medieval and the modern 
conceptions derives in particular from the context in which each model is found. 
In particular, what is most significant seems to be the presence that the idea of 
teleology has in the first of the two. Aquinas explicitly notes that not only is the 
end of all things the good, and more specifically God, but he also says that all things 
attempt to make themselves be like to Him.20 He doesn’t just mean intelligent 
beings, but all things, even those which lack knowledge. The difference, in this 
regard, between man and the physical world is not found so much in the end, but 
rather in the manner, be it free or necessary, of attaining it, and also in the degree, 
greater or lesser, to which all can enjoy it. The human being, indeed, can come to 
understand and love God, even if he will never come to comprehend Him, while the 
rest of the beings in our cosmos will not achieve even that much.
The reach of the affirmation that beings lacking knowledge act for an end is a 
topic that has provoked much debate. The arrival of modern science on the scene 
has relegated final causes to a second plane: everything is explained by efficient 
causality. Nevertheless, this does not mean that wherever one finds a scientist one 
also finds a rejection of natural teleology. William Harvey (+1657), for example, 
the discoverer of the circulatory system, based his reasonings about the movement 
of the blood on a clearly finalistic approach. In his opinion, the movement of the 
blood is only understandable on the basis of an explanation of the structure of blood 
vessels which, as he says, are made for this movement. And thus, the greater width 
of the arteries (with respect to the veins) explains their capacity for inducing blood 
flow, even against the force of gravity.21
The affirmation of finality in the natural world presupposes, in the words of 
Saint Thomas, the recognition of an intelligence that governs the movement of its 
beings. And because of this we find that the workings of nature proceed toward 
their end in an orderly way, as do the actions of a wise man.22 In tending to their 
20. Thomas Aquinas. De veritate, XXII, 2.
21. Harvey, William. “On the Motion of the Heart and Blood in Animals”, Scientific Papers: Physiology, 
Medicine, Surgery, Geology, with Introductions, Notes and Ilustrations, Charles W. Eliot, ed. New York: Collier 
and Son, 1910: 62-147. 
22. Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra gentiles, III, 24. (“impossibile est aliqua contraria et dissonantia in unum 
ordinem concordare semper vel pluries nisi alicuius gubernatione, ex qua omnibus et singulis tribuitur ut ad certum 
finem tendant. Sed in mundo videmus res diversarum naturarum in unum ordinem concordare, non ut raro et a 
casu, sed ut semper vel in maiori parte. Oportet ergo esse aliquem cuius providentia mundus gubernetur. Et hunc 
dicimus Deum”). 
In this way, among natural beings it “contrary and discordant things cannot, always or for the most 
part, be parts of one order except under someone’s government, which enables all and each to tend to a 
definite end. But in the world we find that things of diverse natures come together under one order, and 
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perfection, things seek their good, “since a thing is good to the extent that it is 
perfect. Moreover, by virtue of tending to be good it tends to the divine likeness, for 
a thing is made like unto God in so far as it is good.”23 
Together with noting that things tend towards an end, Saint Thomas is also 
pointing out that in all beings there is an appetite for the good.24 This causes greater 
difficulties than the former issue: even if we can say that the arrow tends to the 
target to the degree that there is an archer whose intelligence directs the arrow, it 
will be a bit artificial and forced if we attribute an appetite for the good to all things, 
even inanimate things. This idea of a natural appetite for the good is also present 
in the Thomistic text we are commenting on, which begins by saying that the body 
tends to its own place “with a natural appetite.”25
Today it is hard for us to imagine that there could be appetite in non-rational beings: 
how could we accept that there is appetite in a stone or a fern? And nevertheless, 
St. Thomas does not hesitate to say yes to this idea, because, were it not so, those 
beings would not tend to their maximum perfection. In his commentary on the 
Physics of Aristotle, Aquinas emphasizes that the idea of appetite is linked with that 
of lack.26 Appetite is a tendency towards a certain kind of good: it is an inclination 
towards one’s own perfection. But the fact that a certain inclination exists in a 
determined subject does not necessarily mean that that subject is conscious of this 
inclination. Only in beings that enjoy intelligence can the tendency towards the 
good be conscious. In other beings, this tendency or appetite exists in its own way: 
“[n]ow, it belongs to every being to seek its perfection and the conservation of its 
being. Each being does so according to its mode: for intellectual beings through will, 
for animals through sensible appetite, and to those lacking sense through natural 
appetite.”27
this not rarely or by chance, but always or for the most part. There must therefore be some being by whose 
providence the world is governed. This we call God” Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra gentiles, I, 13.
23. Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra gentiles, III, 24 (“[n]am per hoc quod tendunt in suam perfectionem, 
tendunt ad bonum: cum unumquodque in tantum bonum sit in quantum est perfectum. Secundum 
vero quod tendit ad hoc quod sit bonum, tendit in divinam similitudinem: Deo enim assimilatur aliquid 
inquantum bonum est.”)
24. The distinction that Saint Thomas makes between natural appetite, sensitive appetite and intellectual 
appetite is not the same thing as saying that the natural appetite is the exclusive domain of inert beings. 
We must first bear in mind that the human being also includes tendencies that he shares with other 
beings, be they inert or ensouled (Thomas Aquinas. Summa theologiae, I-II, 94, 2). In the second place, 
it should be recalled that even at the level of the spirit men have a natural appetite for the good, which 
is indestructible and which is found at the foundation of all their activity: it would impossible to choose 
particular goods if we did not have the appetite for the good in general. As is known, St. Thomas 
constantly insists that everything that is sought, is sought insofar as it is perceived as good, at least in 
some aspect. This is important for showing that in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas the natural also 
plays a role in the spiritual dimension of the human being. Therefore, we can distinguish in the rational 
appetite a voluntas ut natura and a voluntas ut ratio.
25. Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra gentiles, III, 25.
26. Aristotle. In libros Physicorum, I, 15, 136. 
27. Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra gentiles, I, 72 (“[c]uilibet autem enti competit appetere suam 
perfectionem et conservationem sui esse: unicuique tamen secundum suum modum, intellectualibus 
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In this sense, both the human being as well as other beings tend to the good, 
that is, they have an appetite for the good. But in the case of the human being the 
particular goods are desired in a free way. The other beings do not know their end, 
but nonetheless strive to attain it.28 Their action, in a certain way, is like that of 
an instrument.29 Nevertheless, even though they lack any knowledge of their end, 
their directedness towards that end belongs to them as something proper to them, 
something natural.
What we have discussed up to this point helps us to confirm our analysis of the 
differences that exist between the medieval and the modern ways of understanding 
the material world. The point of discord is the role played by teleology in each 
cosmovision. The more one views the world through teleological goggles, the 
greater will be the role of internal causality in each one of those beings. Thus, 
expressions like “bodies have a natural appetite for attaining a specific place” will be 
understandable, even coming into common usage. In contrast, when the teleological 
model is replaced by one characterized by mechanicism, it becomes impossible to 
recognize or attribute any appetite in lower beings.
What do we say, then, about the value of the Thomistic affirmation that we cited 
at the beginning of this article? 
[c]orpus, quod naturali appetitu tendit in suum ubi, tanto vehementius et velocius movetur, 
quanto magis appropinquat fini: unde probat Aristoteles in I de caelo, quod motus naturalis 
rectus non potest esse ad infinitum, quia non magis moveretur postea quam prius. Quod 
igitur vehementius in aliquid tendit post quam prius, non movetur ad infinitum, sed ad 
aliquid determinatum tendit.30 
quidem per voluntatem, animalibus per sensibilem appetitum, carentibus vero sensu per appetitum 
naturalem.”)
28. In this sense, writes St. Thomas: (“[t]amen considerandum est quod aliquid sua actione vel motu tendit ad 
finem dupliciter, uno modo, sicut seipsum ad finem movens, ut homo; alio modo, sicut ab alio motum ad finem, sicut 
sagitta tendit ad determinatum finem ex hoc quod movetur a sagittante, qui suam actionem dirigit in finem. Illa ergo 
quae rationem habent, seipsa movent ad finem, quia habent dominium suorum actuum per liberum arbitrium, 
quod est facultas voluntatis et rationis. Illa vero quae ratione carent, tendunt in finem per naturalem inclinationem, 
quasi ab alio mota, non autem a seipsis, cum non cognoscant rationem finis, et ideo nihil in finem ordinare possunt, 
sed solum in finem ab alio ordinantur.”); “a thing tends to an end by its action or movement in two ways: 
first, as a thing, moving itself to the end, as man; secondly, as a thing moved by another to the end, 
as an arrow tends to a determinate end through being moved by the archer who directs his action to 
the end. Therefore those things that are possessed of reason move themselves to an end; because they 
have dominion over their actions through their free-will, which is the ’faculty of will and reason.’ But 
those things that lack reason tend to an end, by natural inclination, as being moved by another and not 
by themselves; since they do not know the nature of an end as such, and consequently cannot ordain 
anything to an end, but can be ordained to an end only by another.” Summa theologiae, I-II, 1, 2.
29. Thomas Aquinas. Summa theologiae, I, 22, 2.
30. Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra gentiles, III, 25: “a body tending toward its proper place (ubi) by 
natural appetite, is moved more forcibly and swiftly as it approaches its end. Thus, Aristotle proves, in 
On the Heavens I [8: 27a 18], that natural motion in a straight line cannot go on to infinity, for then it 
would be no more moved later than earlier. So, a thing that tends more forcibly later than earlier, toward 
an objective, is not moved toward an indefinite objective, but tends toward some determinate thing”. 
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Within a teleological scheme, these affirmations are valid, although they may 
need to be corrected in certain aspects. If, in contrast, we adopt a mechanicist view, 
the affirmations just cited would only be acceptable as metaphors, explanations that 
seek to reflect in a very elemental way what common sense discovers on the basis 
of the observation of falling bodies.
3. Final causes in biology. The proposal of Ernst Mayr
In the two preceding sections we have sought to emphasize that Saint Thomas 
begins with the presupposition that there exists directionality in nature, i.e. that in 
the natural world everything acts for an end, following a certain order.31 Aquinas 
took this idea from Aristotle, who had spoken in his teaching on physics of the 
orientation towards ends that characterizes the natural world. He writes:
[i]f then it is both by nature and for an end that the swallow makes its nest and the spider its 
web, and plants grow leaves for the sake of the fruit and send their roots down (not up) for 
the sake of nourishment, it is plain that this kind of cause is operative in things which come 
to be and are by nature. And since ’nature’ means two things, the matter and the form, of 
which the latter is the end, and since all the rest is for the sake of the end, the form must be 
the cause in the sense of “that for the sake of which.”32 
It is clear, then, that the Peripatetics, in their approach to the problem of the 
teleology of the physical world, offer finalistic explanations of the organic parts 
and of the behavior of living beings that sound strikingly like modern adaptationist 
explanations.33 Even more, when Aristotle and his disciples write about the 
development of living beings, their explanations, Krieger says, are similar to those 
used by contemporary biologists, and which lack any reference to a principle 
31. This directionality exists in all beings in the natural world: “Again, we should notice that, although 
every agent, both natural and voluntary, intends an end, still it does not follow that every agent knows 
the end or deliberates about the end. To know the end is necessary in those whose actions are not 
determined, but which may act for opposed ends as, for example, voluntary agents. Therefore it is 
necessary that these know the end by which they determine their actions. But in natural agents the 
actions are determined, hence it is not necessary to choose those things which are for the end”. Thomas 
Aquinas. De principiis naturae, III.
32. Aristotle. Physics, 199a 25-30 (Hardie, R. P.; Gaye, R. K. Physica in the Works of Aristotle. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1930). Another finalistic explanation is offered by Aristotle concerning the rain: “[t]
he efficient, controlling and first cause is the circle of the sun’s revolution. For it is evident [... that it] is 
thus the cause of generation and destruction. The earth is at rest and the moisture about it is evaporated 
by the sun’s rays and the other heat from above and rises upwards; but when the heat which caused it 
to rise leaves it [...] the vapor cools and condenses again as a result of the loss of heat and the height and 
turns from air into water: and having become water falls again onto the earth [...] This cycle occurs in 
imitation of the sun’s cycle.” Aristotle. Meteorology, 346b20-36, translated by Webster, Erwin Wentworth. 
Meteorologica. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1931.
33. Lennox, James. “Teleology”, keywords in Evolutionary Biology, Evelyn Fox Keller, Elisabeth Lloyd, 
eds. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1992: 327.
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of movement that is extrinsic to the thing itself (such as the First Motor of the 
Stagirite), but instead admit an intrinsic principle of movement in certain beings34. 
The entire natural world, in this way, experiences a kind of dynamism, to 
such a degree that the order of nature is only intelligible to us on its basis.35 This 
dynamism does not express itself in an arbitrary way: natural beings present a 
definite tendentiality, in accordance with a series of spatio-temporal and functional 
patterns belonging to each being: there exist a great variety of possible processes in 
function of the concurrence of the different dynamisms, but the processes revolve 
around specific patterns.36
If this is so, the laws of nature, which are the expression of the tendentiality and 
regularity of the physical world, contain clear information about the possible course 
of events, information that expresses the possibilities of this natural dynamism when 
certain concrete conditions hold. This information, as Artigas says, has a dynamic 
aspect (patterns of processes) and a structural aspect (patterns of spatial structure); 
the two aspects are interwoven and integrated into the successive developments of 
this dynamism.37
Given that in nature we experience the existence of final causality, in the realm 
of the living, which belongs to the natural world, it will also be possible to identify 
the presence of an order or teleology. This is the thesis of Ernst Mayr, the German 
biologist and historian of science, who holds that no other doctrine has so influenced 
biology as teleology has (one should bear in mind that this doctrine constituted the 
predominant vision of the world prior to Darwin).38 Furthermore, the belief in a 
finality in nature (specifically, at the level of the living) still occupies “considerable 
space” in various recent philosophies of biology. 
It hardly needs to be said that the characteristics of all living organisms are, to a 
certain degree, teleological: the wings of a bird serve for flying; the eyes of animals, 
for seeing; the kidneys are structured in order to regulate the composition of the 
blood, etc.39 These bodily structures represent, in some way, a natural capacity for 
adaptation. This can be seen, for instance, in wings and in hands, in organs like the 
kidneys, or in behaviors like the “courtship display” of the turkey.40
34. Krieger, Gerald. “Transmogrifying teleological talk?”. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 20 
(1998): 7.
35. Artigas, Mariano. La inteligibilidad de la naturaleza. Pamplona: Ediciones de la Universidad de 
Navarra, 1992: 23 and following. 
36. Artigas, Mariano. Filosofía de la naturaleza. Pamplona: Ediciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 2008: 
286.
37. Artigas, Mariano. La inteligibilidad de la naturaleza...: 126-127.
38. Mayr, Ernst. What Makes Biology Unique? Considerations on the Autonomy of a Scientific Discipline. 
Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 2004: 39.
39. Other examples of this teleology of the human body are the preservation of bodily temperature or 
homeostatic reactions in general, as well as all the other functional structures designed anatomically and 
physiologically for fulfilling a certain function. For more on this issue: Ayala, Francisco. “Teleological 
Explanations in Evolutionary Biology”. Philosophy of Science, 37 (1970): 8-9.
40. Dobzhansky, Theodosius. Evolution. San Francisco: Freeman, 1977: 328.
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Given this explanation of final causes in biological science, the idea of a teleology 
of nature, despite its strongly theological foundations, has been a thesis shared 
even by authors who do not believe in the hand of God but who do believe in a 
progressive tendency of the world towards an always-growing perfection,41 a kind 
of tendency or inclination of things towards their own perfection (an idea which, 
by the way, has a strong presence in the work of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle 
and Stoic philosophy). The teleological vision became increasingly strong within 
philosophy, beginning with the Greeks and continuing up to the 18th and 19th 
centuries, retaining its place when Christianity constituted its primary source of 
support.42
In Mayr’s opinion, keeping in mind the concept of a scala naturae, understood 
as the inclination or tendency of natural objects towards their own perfection, 
there were few philosophers that didn’t believe in progress and improvement. Even 
scientists like Lamarck had believed in something like a natural finalism.43
Consequently —and despite the fact that in the era of evolutionist synthesis 
(primarily the first half of the 20th century) there were virtually no biologists who 
gave credence to final causality— the belief in the teleology of the natural order was 
able to discover, outside the field of philosophy of biology, a terrain that was even 
more favorable. Thus, as Mayr points out, almost all the thinkers who wrote about 
evolutionary change in the 100 years following 1859 were convinced finalists. 
Further, all three philosophers closest to Darwin —Whewell, Herschel, and Mill—
believed in final causes.44 
In sum, the refutation of a teleological reading of the natural world developed 
by scientists of an evolutionist stripe did not eliminate philosophy’s concern 
about a constitutive finality of nature. Behavior directed towards an end is found 
everywhere in the organic world; for instance, the majority of the activities linked 
with migration, the hunt for food, courtship, ontogeny and all the phases of 
reproduction are characterized by this orientation to ends.45
4. Ways of understanding the Thomist argument
Now that these clarifications have been made, we can enter into the problem that 
arises from applying the indicated principles to the specifically human realm. Can we 
believe that in our spirit and in its operations it also happens that igitur vehementius in 
41. Mayr, Ernst. What Makes Biology Unique?...: 41.
42. Mayr, Ernst. What Makes Biology Unique?...: 41.
43. Mayr, Ernst. What Makes Biology Unique?...: 41
44. Mayr, Ernst. What Makes Biology Unique?...: 43. 
45. Mayr, Ernst. Toward a New Philosophy of Biology. Observations of an Evolutionist. Cambridge (UK): 
Cambridge University Press, 1988: 45.
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aliquid tendit post quam prius, non movetur ad infinitum, sed aliquid determinatum tendit?46 
Let us return to the root of the problem: if teleology exists, then it will be possible to 
recognize analogies between what happens in the material world and what happens 
in the human realm. Nonetheless, we will have to determine the measure to which 
those analogies apply and, therefore, the value of the above-mentioned principle 
as an argument. An argument that is used to support something as different as the 
thesis that the progressive character of the desire to know shows that it is not in 
vain, and, even more, that God is its natural objective.
There are various ways of understanding the linkage between the movement of 
bodies and the progressive character of the desire to know. Nevertheless, simplifying 
a little, we can reduce to two the positions that might apply in this subject matter. 
The first and strongest could begin by asserting that, since in physics uniformly 
accelerated movement also indicates the presence of an end point, the movements 
of that nature which are present in the human being must also lead us to the same 
consequence.
Next, we note that the progressive character of the desire to know is a species 
within uniformly accelerated movements. We need only apply to the desire to 
know the consequences that follow from the previous rules and thereby deduce 
the existence of an object in which this desire to know finds its repose. It has to 
be said, however, that the weakness of this type of reasoning lies in the fact that it 
presupposes innumerable premises that are far from being unquestionable. Even 
among those who maintain a teleological vision of the universe, the univocal 
application of these principles will surely awaken much resistance. These difficulties 
do not arise just because of the modern way of understanding nature; rather, they 
can also be supported by many Thomistic texts where Aquinas brings together and 
makes his own the Aristotelian teaching that diverse objects should be studied by 
methods that are similarly diverse.
The second way of understanding the problem has less logical force, but is more 
persuasive. It consists in understanding the text of book III of the Summa contra 
gentiles in a weaker fashion. According to this approach, Saint Thomas would be 
fundamentally asserting two facts: first, that there exist uniformly accelerated 
movements in nature; and second, that the desire to know increases in the human 
person. From this point the argumentation can continue: in physics, the existence 
of a movement of this kind is an indicator that there exists an end point for that 
movement. Otherwise, this type of movement would not exist (in fact, not all 
movements are of this type). What happens in physics is not accidental; rather, it is 
yet another example that shows that nature does nothing in vain. Stated in another 
way, to accept that in the material world there may exist uniformly accelerated 
movements that lead nowhere would involve postulating a certain regression to 
infinity. 
46. Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra gentiles, III, 25, 13: “a thing that tends more forcibly later than earlier, 
toward an objective, is not moved toward an indefinite objective, but tends toward some determinate 
thing”.
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As is apparent, Saint Thomas’s explanation of the desire to understand God 
begins with a consideration of natural movement, i.e. what occurs in the physical 
world. This leads us to think that, for Aquinas, the central case of natural desire is 
that of an appetite associated with the movement of bodies. Only in a derivative 
sense can it be applied to the desire of the soul to know God or the First Cause. 
In this way, when he speaks of the natural character of movement in the physical 
world, as well as of the natural character of the appetite to know God, the primary 
sense of “natural” or “nature” to which he is referring is the one that applies to 
physical realities. It is from this starting point that he passes to the explanation of 
human appetites.
In Thomist thought this application of the physical sense of nature to other areas 
of reality seems to be a constant. This is also true for Stoic philosophy which, in 
dealing with the natural law, does so with a strongly cosmological emphasis. But 
is this naturalistic explanation of the moral possible for St. Thomas? We think it is 
not. In contrast to what he does in the rest of the topics he studies, in the realm 
of morality the concept of nature does not find its primary meaning in physical 
realities. It is true that Aquinas the theologian speaks of “natural inclinations,” 
affirming that there are universal tendencies that are common to human beings and 
non-human things, but the fact that the moral law is natural does not mean that it 
functions in the way scientific laws do.
Having made this assertion, we can ask ourselves: aren’t there movements 
similar to natural movement in other dimensions of reality? And if there are, 
will it not also be the case that those movements constitute a powerful indication 
that they are directed towards a determined place? Let us suppose that we agree 
that “[t]he more a person knows, the more is he moved by the desire to know,” 
isn’t that progressivity also a distinctive characteristic of the movements we were 
mentioning? And if nature never acts in vain, that is, if things have a finality: would 
it not be reasonable that the desire for knowledge would also be oriented towards 
an end, and that if that end did not exist it would produce a true frustration of that 
tendency?
If we argue in this manner we perhaps lose rigor, but we have the advantage of 
seeing that the principle “a thing that tends more forcibly later than earlier, toward 
an objective, is not moved toward an indefinite objective, but tends toward some 
determinate thing” is found in physics by simple observation of the fall of bodies; 
however, it has an application that is broader than that discipline alone. Not because 
physics applies to the entire human world, but because the human spirit and the 
relations of bodies are two zones of reality, and the principle cited is constitutive 
of all the real —and not just physics— at least when things are viewed from a 
teleological point of view. That is, we are not claiming here that physics applies to 
what goes beyond it, but rather that even physics is subjected to certain principles 
that are applicable to the entirety of reality.
In short, we are affirming the possibility of a metaphysic, that is, of suprasensible 
principles. Nonetheless, there is an important difference between the probative 
value of the principle “a thing that tends more forcibly later than earlier, toward 
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an objective, is not moved toward an indefinite objective, but tends toward some 
determinate thing” in the two fields. In physics it is applicable because otherwise we 
would have to accept a regression to infinity. In the human field, to the contrary, 
it applies because the alternative is not reasonable, since it would mean accepting 
that the world is a tease and lacks meaning. But this lack of meaning is possible, or 
at least we can affirm it: in fact, many of our contemporaries do so.
What we have discussed up to now shows that the Thomistic argument in Summa 
contra gentiles III, 25 can be understand in diverse ways according to the strength 
and univocity that are attributed to his claims. The less univocal these affirmations 
are, the more defensible the argument will be in the face of criticisms by modern 
and contemporary thinkers. At the same time, however, the argument will have 
less probative value.47 Going to extremes, it does not seem that this argument has 
a merely metaphorical value for Saint Thomas. But we also cannot read him in a 
univocal manner, as a rationalist would do. 
At base, this brief text is related to the very character of Summa contra gentiles 
in which it is integrated. If it is a case, as is usually claimed, of a work that is 
intended to support those who are going to evangelize non-Christians, we would 
have to understand it as one among a stock of arguments —perhaps like what the 
Aristotelian Topica does. These arguments, naturally, are only sketched out and it 
would be task of the reader to adapt them to the argument that he is involved in. 
In that case, the interlocutor would be a non-Christian who accepts the teachings 
of Aristotle. It is not accidental, then, that the bases of the argumentation are 
Aristotelian: the principle of movement of heavy bodies, on the one hand, and the 
natural and progressive character of the desire to know. If we add to this a teleological 
context through which to see the world —which every Aristotelian would agree to 
without any problem— then we have a situation where the conclusions would not 
be difficult to accept by an interlocutor like the one St. Thomas has in mind. 
Naturally, a question comes to the fore: what is the value of all of this if the 
interlocutor is not an Aristotelians? Aquinas did not know of this problem, because 
the question of the truth of the Aristotelian theory only arose with the advent of 
modern science. Nevertheless, we believe we can say that, with some modifications, 
and attributing a less apodictic character to his assertions, his argument is plausible.
5. Human knowledge and the natural desire to know
This final section is dedicated to the study of the principal implications for human 
knowledge that this affirmation of a natural desire to know would have. Aquinas’s 
idea is a clear application of the Aristotelian principle of the desire to understand 
the truth that appears in Metaphysics A 1. It is also an analogous version of the desire 
47. In order to see the importance of the intellectual contexts in which these diverse arguments are 
developed, it will be illustrative to consult: Smith, Barry. “Zum Wesen des Common sense: Aristoteles 
und die naive Physik”. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 46 (1992): 510 and following.
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to know causes, or of the desire for happiness, that St. Thomas discusses in other 
passages of the Corpus thomisticum. 
The Thomistic argument begins with the affirmation of God’s existence, qua first 
object of desire.48 This object moves all things by love,49 as Aristotle teaches in Book 
XII of the Metaphysics. For this reason, it has been thought that what is characteristic 
of God seen as First Mover is His condition as “appealing.” Some authors have 
noted that, for these purposes, “appeal” and “desire” refer to the same reality in the 
work of St. Thomas.50 Nevertheless, the terms “appetite” and “appeal” have a more 
generic and undetermined meaning, in the sense that they can be applied even to 
beings which lack knowledge. For their part, the terms “desire” as a noun and “to 
desire” have, in general, a meaning that is more specific and determined, being 
usable, stricto sensu, with those beings that have knowledge.51 
Saint Thomas himself proves that the notion of “desire” necessarily implies a form 
of knowledge. As he observes, even non-sentient creates act via a type of intellectual 
apprehension, not that which it itself can attain, but rather the knowledge of the 
first motors, that order each thing to its end: and therefore without knowledge they 
have no delight nor joy at all.52 Similarly, if the First Motor is our principal object of 
desire, as well as the end of all things, that motor must be a type of kind of knowing 
agent that, at least, attracts things towards itself because of its own knowledge. 
Given that the desire to know is what responds to the problem of the end of man, 
this movement of the subject is the root of all appetite. In the case of the human 
being, St. Thomas believes that this desire is related to the hunger of the creature to 
become like the divine substance,53 which is explained by the fact that everything 
desires its own perfection.54 Now, a thing is perfect by its form, since it exists by 
its form, and a thing is perfect insofar as it is. But since the form of the effect is a 
likeness of the form of the agent, 
ya que todo agente obra algo símil a si mismo, el mismo agente es apetecido y tiene razón de 
bien, porque la razón por la cual es apetecido es para participar en esa similitud, recibiéndola 
48. Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra gentiles, I, 37.
49. Thomas Aquinas. Sententia libri Metaphysicae, XII, 9.
50. For example: Laporta, Jorge. “Pour trouver le sens exact des terms appetitus naturalis, desiderium 
naturale, amor naturalis, etc. chez Thomas d’Aquin”. Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen 
Age, 48 (1973): 57 and following.
51. Cambiasso, Jorge. El deseo de entender la verdad en la “Summa contra gentiles”...: 156.
52. Thomas Aquinas. Scriptum super Sententiis, I, 1, 4, 1. 
53. Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra gentiles, II, 43.
54. In this sense, St. Thomas writes: “since every agent produces something similar to itself, the same 
agent is desired and has the ratio of the good, because the reason that it is desired is in order to participate 
in that likeness, receiving it or imitating it. Therefore, if this agent is the divine Agent, all things desire His 
likeness.” Summa contra gentiles, II, 81 (“[i]n qualibet re quae potest pertingere ad aliquam perfectionem, 
invenitur naturalis appetitus illius perfectionis: bonum enim est quod omnia appetunt, ita tamen quod 
unumquodque proprium bonum.”) “[t]hen, too, in every thing capable of attaining certain perfection, 
we find a natural desire for that perfection, since good is what all things desire, yet in such fashion that 
each thing desires the good proper to itself.” 
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o imitándola. Por lo cual, si este agente es el Agente divino, todas las cosas apetecen a su 
semejanza 55
As a manner of proving the argument, St. Thomas states that everything created, 
and not just man, attempts to liken itself to the divine goodness. He writes,
[o]mnis res per suum motum vel actionem tendit in aliquod bonum sicut in finem, ut 
supra ostensum est. In tantum autem aliquid de bono participat, in quantum assimilatur 
primae bonitati, quae Deus est. Omnia igitur per motus suos et actiones tendunt in divinam 
similitudinem sicut in finem ultimum.56 
Despite this, creatures do not attain the good (which is their perfection) as it is 
in God, although each one of them copies, in its own way, the goodness of the First 
Cause. For God it is the same thing to be, to live, to be wise, to be blessed, and to 
be whatever else seems to belong to perfection and goodness. This does not occur 
in creatures, which are not their own being. Therefore, if created things are good 
insofar as they exist, and because none of them is its own being, none of them is its 
own goodness. Rather, each of them is good by participation in goodness, just as it 
is being by participation in existing being itself.57
The reason for recognizing that creatures aspire to likeness with the divine 
substance is rooted in the fact that that substance is its cause. Things tend to the 
divine likeness because it is supremely good, as has been said. Now, it is as a result of 
the goodness of God that He confers being on all things, for a being acts by virtue of 
the fact that it is actually perfect. Later Saint Thomas concludes, and so, things tend 
toward the divine likeness by the fact that they are causes of others.58
The relation between the ordering of reality by a First Mover, the fact of divine 
causality and the idea of likeness to God, is seen most clearly in the case of the 
human being. As Aquinas observes, the human being naturally desires to know the 
cause of any known effect. Now, human understanding knows universal being. He 
desires, in fact, to know his own cause, which is God alone. But nobody attains to 
his ultimate end as long as his desire is not quenched. [n]on sufficit igitur ad felicitatem 
humanam, quae est ultimus finis, qualiscumque intelligibilis cognitio, nisi divina cognitio 
adsit, quae terminat naturale desiderium sicut ultimus finis 59 
55. Cambiasso, Jorge. El deseo de entender la verdad en la “Summa contra gentiles”...: 226. It is important to 
note that God Himself is the one who has embedded his likeness in creates things: Summa contra gentiles, 
II, 45. 
56. Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra gentiles, III, 19: “[f]urthermore, everything tends through its motion 
or action toward a good, as its end. Now, a thing participates in the good precisely to the same extent that 
it becomes like the first goodness, which is God. So, all things tend through their movements and actions 
toward the divine likeness, as toward their ultimate end”.
57. Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra gentiles, III, 20.
58. Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra gentiles, III, 21.
59. Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra gentiles, III, 25: “Therefore, for human happiness, which is the 
ultimate end, it is not enough to have merely any kind of intelligible knowledge; there must be divine 
knowledge, as an ultimate end, to terminate the natural desire”.”).
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Given that the knowledge of God is the final end of knowledge and of human 
action, 
[f]inis igitur intellectus est finis omnium actionum humanarum. Finis autem et bonum 
intellectus est verum: et per consequens ultimus finis primum verum. Est igitur ultimus finis 
totius hominis, et omnium operationum et desideriorum eius, cognoscere primum verum, 
quod est Deus.60 
This allows us to conclude that the natural desire that Aquinas is referring to has 
a determined object. It is not an abstract or disconnected appetite. This movement 
ends with the intellectual grasp of the First Cause.61 Human happiness, in this sense, 
does not consist in an act of the will. Blessedness only exists in rational creatures, as 
opposed to the delectation of the appetite, which we even see in creatures lacking 
reason. 
Finally, we arrive at the question about the nature of this desire. For despite 
what has been discussed so far, some authors think this appetite is not linked in any 
way with the vision of God.62 Saint Thomas himself seems to incline towards this 
reading in De veritate q. 22, a. 7. However, this is not a datum that is contrary to our 
interpretation. On the contrary, in the text of De veritate Saint Thomas is referring 
to the problem of justification, and not to the issue of the human end. When he 
turns to that topic he does not hesitate to assert that the natural desire of the human 
being is the vision of the first cause.63
In regards to the nature of this desire, a first possibility is that it is a “desire of 
the will.” If this is true, the natural desire to see God would be an elicit-conditional 
movement that belongs to the realm of psychology,64 and that is preceded by 
intellectual apprehension. Its conditional character is explained by the fact that it 
consists in a desire which can express itself in the following terms: I would desire to 
see God if that were possible.65
60. Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra gentiles, III, 25: “the end of the intellect is the end of all human 
actions. ’But the end and good of the intellect are the true;’ consequently, the supreme truth is the 
ultimate end. So, the ultimate end of the whole man, and of all his operations and desires, is to know 
the first truth, which is God”.
61. Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra gentiles, III, 25.
62. Gaboriau, Florent. Thomas d’Aquin en dialogue. Paris: Fac, 1993: 81 and following.
63. Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra gentiles, III, 57. The perfection of the understanding depends on the 
human being having achieved the knowledge (or vision) of God. This desire is a natural desire, which 
materializes as admiration-desire, and which is grounded in the self-evidence of the principle that the 
knowledge of the ultimate causes of reality is good for the human being. Its natural character is shown by 
the fact that once we comprehend the existence of God, the desire to know His essence arises naturaliter, 
without any deliberation: Feingold, Lawrence. The Natural Desire to See God according to St. Thomas Aquinas 
and His Interpreters. Rome: Sapientia Press, 2010: 44.
64. Laporta, Jorge. “Les notions d’appétit naturel et de puissance obédientielle chez S Thomas d’Aquin”. 
Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses, 5 (1928): 257 and following.
65. Pacheco, Cipriano Franco. O desejo natural da visão de Deus...: 35. 
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In the second place —and this is the interpretation we believe to be correct— this 
desire that is natural to man would be equivalent to a “desire of reason,” understood 
as a metaphysical reality.66 This means that this kind of appetitive movement derives 
from the action of the First Mover in man, which imprints, in conformity with 
the nature of each being, the tendency towards or necessity of seeing the deity. It 
represents, in this sense, a basic and constitutive inclination of human life, a form 
of tendency that marks one of the goods that constitute the integral development of 
every human being: the truth.
6. Man as capax Dei
The natural desire to see God and the natural capacity of reason to know Him are 
a demonstration that man truly is capax Dei.67 This expression, which apparently was 
first used by Rufinus, was intensively developed by Saint Augustine,68 who turns 
it into a central problem for Christian philosophy. Hence, when Thomas Aquinas 
discusses the meaning of this expression, he is following on a rich tradition of 
thought. Beginning with Augustine’s De Trinitate, and integrating the contributions 
of the Fathers of the Church and of the great masters of Dominican and Franciscan 
theology about man as imago Dei, he unites this truth with Aristotle’s teaching about 
the natural desire to know, possessed by every man because of his condition as a 
rational animal. 
Aquinas affirms that all beings seek their own perfection, and that the perfection 
of each being is dependent on its nature. Thus, the plenitude of each thing must 
be appropriate to its substantial form, and for humans their substantial form is 
the intellect. Now, if the intellect were not able to know God, who is, says Saint 
Thomas, the principle of perfection of all things, it would not experience the 
natural desire we have been discussing in this article. This natural desire would 
thus be in vain, and contrary to nature’s manner of behaving, for nature never 
acts vainly.69
The definition of man as capax Dei has a strong theological and supernatural root, 
because, as Saint Thomas states, capax Dei means capax aeternae vitae70 (he also speaks 
of capax gratiae and capax beatae cognitionis). However, it seems to us that the meaning 
66. Laporta, Jorge. Les notions d’appétit naturel et de puissance...: 257-277.
67. For an examination of the relationship between the issues of man as capax Dei and of the natural 
desire to see God, Thomas Aquinas. Summa theologiae I, 93, 2 and I-II, 3, 8.
68. Saint Augustine. De Trinitate, XIV, 8, 11.
69. Saint Thomas says: [q]uia naturale desiderium nihil aliud est quam inclinatio inhaerens rebus ex ordinatione 
primi moventis, quae non potest esse supervacua. Thomas Aquinas. Sententia libri Ethicorum, I, 2, 21, translated 
by Litzinger, C.I.: Thomas Aquinas. Commentary of the Nicomachean Ethics. Chicago: Regnery, 1964: “a 
natural desire is nothing else but an inclination belonging to things by the disposition of the first mover, 
and this cannot be frustrated”. 
70. Thomas Aquinas. Summa theologiae, I, 23, 1.
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of this human capacity can be understood more simply as the capacity to know the 
truth (and the truth of truths): the human being is capable of God insofar as he is 
able to know the truth. To conclude: man is capax Dei because he is capax veritatis.
What is interesting about this argument is that it permits relating the theology of 
St. Thomas to his philosophy and epistemology. Man is capax Dei because of a divine 
gift. God has freely given him that capacity, and understanding this is a question of 
theology. But interpreting this condition as the capacity to know the truth, and, as 
Aquinas thinks, to know the full truth or the first truth, is something that demands 
a purely rational argument. Indeed, Aquinas thinks that what we know solely by 
natural reason is that God is above all things that exist and that He is the principle 
of all that exists. The thesis of Saint Thomas is as follows: 
secundum quod naturam alicuius rei ex eius proprietatibus et effectibus cognoscere 
possumus, sic eam nomine possumus significare. Unde, quia substantiam lapidis ex eius 
proprietate possumus cognoscere secundum seipsam, sciendo quid est lapis, hoc nomen lapis 
ipsam lapidis naturam, secundum quod in se est, significat, significat enim definitionem 
lapidis, per quam scimus quid est lapis. Ratio enim quam significat nomen, est definitio, ut 
dicitur in IV Metaphys. Sed ex effectibus divinis divinam naturam non possumus cognoscere 
secundum quod in se est, ut sciamus de ea quid est; sed per modum eminentiae et causalitatis 
et negationis [...] Et sic hoc nomen Deus significat naturam divinam. Impositum est enim 
nomen hoc ad aliquid significandum supra omnia existens, quod est principium omnium, et 
remotum ab omnibus. Hoc enim intendunt significare nominantes Deum.71
When Aquinas explains what it means to say that there is a natural desire in 
man to see God, which means that he is capax Dei, he begins with the idea that this 
natural desire depends on a natural inclination, present in all creatures, to unite 
themselves with their principle, which is God.72 In addition, in the case of man, this 
desire expresses the natural tendency that he has to beatitude or happiness.73 
In the previous section I said that the natural desire discussed in Summa contra 
gentiles cannot be understood apart from the explanation of the natural desire to 
know that Saint Thomas gives in his Sententia libri Metaphysicae. In its operation, 
the human intellect receives a kind of “push” towards the knowledge of the quid 
of the things that surround him. Human knowledge is, thus, the perception of the 
quid, and not the perception of the external and inessential attributes of the thing. 
71. Thomas Aquinas. Summa theologiae, I, 13, 8: “we can name a thing according to the knowledge we 
have of its nature from its properties and effects. Hence, because we can know what stone is in itself 
from its property, this name “stone” signifies the nature of the stone itself; for it signifies the definition of 
stone, by which we know what it is, for the idea which the name signifies is the definition, as is said in 
Metaph. IV. Now from the divine effects we cannot know the divine nature in itself, so as to know what 
it is; but only by way of eminence, and by way of causality, and of negation [...] Thus the name “God” 
signifies the divine nature, for this name was imposed to signify something existing above all things, the 
principle of all things and removed from all things; for those who name God intend to signify all this”.
72. Thomas Aquinas. Sententia libri Metaphysicae, I, 1.
73. For example, in Summa theologiae we read that man is capax summi boni (I, 93, 2) and is capax 
beatitudinis (II-II, 25, 12). 
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This “push” is what Aquinas has called “the natural desire to understand the why 
of things.” 
This desire originates with wonder, and does not rest until the mind is able to 
grasp the essence of the cause. This is why the natural desire to know is related to 
the problem of the happiness of the human being. Part of happiness involves the 
mind’s grasping the essence of the First Cause: this is the way a human being attains 
his perfection. Man is only fulfilled when the intellect receives God as the object of 
its desiring.74
In consequence, in his acts of knowledge man experiences a radical inclination 
to know the First Cause of all things. This inclination is due to the action of God 
Himself, who orders and defines the inclinations of each being according to what 
is most appropriate to its essential structure. In the case of the human being, God 
does not just impose certain natural inclinations, e.g. to the preservation of one’s 
own life, or to life in society. Rather, He also provides man with a special capacity 
to attain to God: to see Him, to love Him, to know Him personally. Therefore, by his 
nature, and because of the nature of his intelligence, the human being is capable of 
God. He is able to receive God in himself by the path of knowledge. 
What does it mean to say that the human being is capable of God? Here it means 
that he is able to know God without any violation or even modification of the 
nature of his intellect, or of his nature in general. God as an object of knowledge is 
related to man as the infinite relates with the finite; nonetheless, the human being 
that sees God continues to be a man. The human being, despite his finite nature, has 
the potency to possess the infinite and rest in it.75
Finally, even though all things seek to unite themselves to God, only the human 
being is capax Dei, because only he can love God and know Him.76 Only the human 
being is made in the image and likeness of God, and only he can attain to a personal 
relationship with the Creator: 
[a]d secundum dicendum quod similitudo imaginis attenditur in natura humana secundum 
quod est capax Dei, scilicet ipsum attingendo propria operatione cognitionis et amoris. 
Similitudo autem vestigii attenditur solum secundum repraesentationem aliquam ex 
impressione divina in creatura existentem, non autem ex eo quod creatura irrationalis, in 
qua est sola talis similitudo possit ad Deum attingere per solam suam operationem. Quod 
autem deficit a minori, non habet congruitatem ad id quod est maius, sicut corpus quod 
non est aptum perfici anima sensitiva, multo minus est aptum perfici anima intellectiva. 
Multo autem est maior et perfectior unio ad Deum secundum esse personale quam quae est 
secundum operationem. Et ideo creatura irrationalis, quae deficit ab unione ad Deum per 
operationem, non habet congruitatem ut uniatur ei secundum esse personale.77
74. Thomas Aquinas. Sententia libri De anima, III, 9, 726.
75. Rhonheimer, Martin. The Perspective of Morality. Philosophical Foundations of Thomistic Virtue Ethics. 
Washington DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011: 79-80.
76. Thomas Aquinas. De veritate, XXII, 2. It is worth emphasizing that for Saint Thomas, all rational beings 
know God in every cognition, because just as nothing can be seen as good except by its similitude with 
the first goodness, nothing is knowable other than through its similarity with the first truth. 
77. Thomas Aquinas. Summa theologiae, III, 4, 1: “The likeness of image is found in human 
nature, forasmuch as it is capable of God, viz. by attaining to Him through its own operation 
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7. Final considerations 
At the beginning of our article we showed how St. Thomas applies the argument 
from natural movement to the problem of the knowledge of God qua ultimate end 
of human life. What Aquinas wanted to do is highlight the fact that the spiritual 
development of human beings is not found in an activity of the will or of the 
appetites, but rather in an act of reason, and, in particular, in the act of vision-
intellection of the greatest object of knowledge that exists.
The relation between knowledge and natural movement isn’t arbitrary. Just as a 
body tends to its proper place by natural appetite, the more rapidly and forcefully 
it moves the closer it gets to its end; similarly, our intelligence experiences a greater 
impulse or desire to know the greater knowledge of reality we have. Since we are 
spiritual and personal beings, human beings have a thirst for knowledge that is 
unquenchable. Reality demands our attention, it is there waiting to be known. For 
example, we can point to that urge that certain European explorers of the 18th 
and 19th centuries felt to know all the regions of the world that were, until then, 
unknown to Europe.78
In this sense, the thesis that supports St. Thomas’s idea is that, in order to desire 
to know, it is necessary to know something. And thus, the more one knows, the 
greater impetus this natural desire to know will have. This impulse,79 which, as 
Spaemann says, is a sign that reason is the form of life of the human being,80 can 
only be understood as a desire for knowledge of causes. This is a natural desire 
unleashed by wonder in the face of what is, and which pushes him onwards with 
his search for knowledge.81 This appetite does not rest until the intelligence has 
grasped the essence of the causes. It follows that the grasping of the essence of the 
First Cause forms part of the human felicitas.
Therefore, it is sufficient for the human being to experience the good of knowledge 
in order that that natural desire will affect him with greater strength. Given that, 
the more it nears its natural place, the truth of truths, the more our reason moves 
faster towards it.
of knowledge and love. But the likeness of trace regards only a representation by Divine 
impression, existing in the creature, and does not imply that the irrational creature, in which such a 
likeness is, can attain to God by its own operation alone. For what does not come up to the less, has 
no fitness for the greater; as a body which is not fitted to be perfected by a sensitive soul is much less 
fitted for an intellectual soul. Now much greater and more perfect is the union with God in personal 
being than the union by operation. And hence the irrational creature which falls short of the union 
with God by operation has no fitness to be united with Him in personal being”.
78. Vázquez, David. La virtud de la studiositas y el conocimiento. Un estudio desde Santo Tomás de Aquino. 
Pamplona: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 2012: 14 and following. 
79. For a review of the relationship there is between desire and impulse in Thomas Aquinas, Mondin, 
Battista. Dizionario enciclopedico del pensiero di San Tommaso d’Aquino. Bolonia: Studio Domenicano, 2000: 
198. 
80. Spaemann, Robert. Persons. The Difference...: 89 and following.
81. Rhonheimer, Martin. The Perspective of Morality...: 77-78.
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In short, this explanation is similar to the one that Plato gives for the origin 
of love: just as love is the child of abundance and of scarcity, in the same way 
what characterizes human knowledge is a kind of tension between knowing and 
not knowing. The desire to know God is an experience of this kind of movement: 
without a little knowledge one could not desire the knowledge of the causes, not 
even the closest causes. Nevertheless, to the degree that this desire is sated, that 
is, to the degree that one distances oneself from scarcity, our reason moves with 
greater strength and rapidity towards the intellection of the Cause of causes.
Similarly, when one first actualizes the desire to know, one is not completely 
unknowing. Absolute ignorance is not conscious of itself, and, as a consequence, 
it doesn’t direct itself to anything. Therefore, there is something of wealth in our 
manner of experiencing the desire of happiness, because reason would not work to 
know God if it didn’t already possess a form of knowledge in act. And thus, writes 
Saint Thomas, the more things one knows the more the desire to know affects 
him.82 
 
82. Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra gentiles, III, 25.
